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Allogeneic blood for transfusion is a potential source of
infection by a variety of known and unknown transmissible
agents. Since the 1980s, with the recognition of human immu-
nodeficiency virus contamination of the blood supply, only a
blood supply with a zero risk to recipients has been politically
acceptable (67). This approach has led to the concept of
“creeping precautionism” in the blood supply (46). The pre-
cautionary principle has grown out of the environmental move-
ment. Briefly, it states “. . .where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage to the environment, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. . .”
(46). To this end, astounding reductions in the viral risk of
allogeneic blood has been accomplished (27). However, a
number of transfusion safety measures have been implemented
to achieve this level of safety, despite relatively poor cost-
effectiveness, in order to assuage the public’s fears (32).
Given the reduction of viral transmission via allogeneic
blood, the low but known risk of bacterial contamination has
emerged as the greatest residual threat of transfusion-trans-
mitted disease (Fig. 1).
TRANSFUSION-TRANSMITTED BACTERIAL
INFECTION OF RED CELLS
Each year, approximately 13,898,000 units of red cells or
whole blood are transfused in the United States alone (1). This
equates to one unit being transfused every 2.3 s. Despite this
large number, sepsis associated with the transfusion of bacte-
rially contaminated red cell blood components is generally
regarded as a very rare event. From 1976 through September
1998, 26 fatalities thought to be secondary to contaminated
whole blood or red cells were reported to the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) (36). Thus, approximately one
red cell-related death per year has been reported. The majority
of deaths reported to the FDA involved Yersinia enterocolitica.
The highest reported incidence of Y. enterocolitica contamination
was reported in New Zealand, with an incidence rate of 1 in
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65,000 and a fatality rate of 1 in 104,000 red cell units transfused
(59). Unrecognized cases, underreporting, and regional variation
may account for observed differences in this incidence.
Interestingly, more recent passive reporting studies of bac-
terially contaminated red cells from the United States, France,
and the United Kingdom that caused symptoms of infection
show a relative paucity of Yersinia cases (Table 1) (35, 51, 57).
Of the reported deaths, one was due to a coagulase-negative
FIG. 1. Risk of infectious disease transmission per unit transfused by year, 1983 to 2001. Reprinted from reference 27 with permission of the
publisher.
TABLE 1. Organisms isolated from red cells implicated in transfusion-associated infectionsa
Organism
No. of contaminated units in:
Total no.






Coagulase-negative staphylococci 2 (1) 2 3 7 (1)
Streptococcus spp. 4d 4
Staphylococcus aureus 2b 2
Enteroccocus faecalis 1c 1
Bacillus cereus 2 2
Propionibacterium acnes 1 1
Subtotal 2 (1 or 50%) 2 (0 or 0%) 13 (0 or 0%) 17 (1 or 6%)
Gram negative
Serratia liquifaciens 2 (2) 1 2 (1) 5 (3)
Serratia marcescens 1 1
Yersinia enterocolitica 1 (1) 1 2 (1)
Enterobacter spp. 1 (1) 1 (1)
Acinetobacter spp. 5 (1)b 5 (1)
Pseudomonas spp. 2 (1) 2 (1)
Escherichia coli 3c 3
Klebsiella pneumoniae 1 1
Proteus mirabilis 1 1
Subtotal 3 (2 or 67%) 2 (1 or 50%) 16 (4 or 25%) 21 (7 or 33%)
Total 5 (3 or 60%) 4 (1 or 25%) 29 (4 or 14%) 38 (8 or 21%)
a Summary of organisms identified in the BACON, SHOT, and BACTHEM studies (35, 51, 57). Numbers and percentages of fatalities are given in parentheses.
b In one case, S. aureus and A. baumannii were both isolated from the implicated bag.
c In one case, E. faecalis and E. coli were both isolated from the implicated bag.
d In two cases, two isolates of Streptococcus were isolated from the implicated bag. Of the eight reported fatalities, seven (87.5%) were due to gram-negative
organisms.
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Staphylococcus strain and seven were due to a variety of gram-
negative organisms (including Serratia liquefaciens in three cases).
These organisms are all capable of growth at 1 to 6°C. Sepsis
associated with the transfusion of red cells contaminated with
gram-negative bacteria is typically severe and rapid in onset. Pa-
tients frequently develop high fever (temperatures as high as
109°F have been observed) and chills during or immediately fol-
lowing transfusion. From 1987 to February 1996, 20 recipients of
Yersinia-infected red cells were reported to the Centers for Dis-
ease Control (S. T. Cookson, M. J. Arduino, S. M. Aguero, W. R.
Jarvis, and the Yersinia Study Group, Program Abstr. 36th Inter-
sci. Conf. Antimicrob. Agents Chemother., abstr. 237, 1996).
Twelve of the 20 recipients died, and the median time to death
was only 25 h. Of the seven who developed disseminated intra-
vascular coagulopathy, six died.
Prospective bacterial cultures of whole blood or red cells, how-
ever, have shown a much higher incidence of bacterial contami-
nation (2 to 4 per 1,000 units); however, the organisms commonly
cultured are Staphylococcus or Propionibacterium spp., which gen-
erally proliferate poorly during storage at 1 to 6°C (4).
TRANSFUSION-TRANSMITTED BACTERIAL
INFECTION OF PLATELETS
Each year, within the United States approximately 4 million
platelet units are transfused (1  106 single-donor apheresis
platelets and 3 million whole-blood-derived platelet concen-
trates) (1). This equates to one platelet unit being transfused
every 8 s. Unlike red cell or whole-blood components, which
are stored at 1 to 6°C, platelets are stored at 20 to 24°C to
preserve function and survival. Such storage makes them an
excellent growth medium for a broad spectrum of bacteria.
Multiple aerobic-culture surveillance studies have demon-
strated that 1 in 1,000 to 2,000 platelet units are bacterially
contaminated (4). Thus, 2,000 to 4,000 bacterially contami-
nated units would be expected to be transfused per year. Es-
timates of the fraction of cases that result in patient symptoms
have been as low as 1 in 10 cases. However, in the only study
that has prospectively cultured platelets that were transfused,
eight culture-positive but Gram stain-negative platelet pools
that were bacterially contaminated resulted in symptoms in
three patients (37.5%) [A. Dykstra, G. Hoeltge, M. Jacobs, J.
Miller, R. Domen, and R. Yomtovian, Transfusion 38(Suppl.):
104S, 1998]. Notably, six Gram stain-positive pools (which
would be expected to have had the highest bacterial load) were
interdicted and never transfused.
Thus, clinical sepsis would be expected in at least 1 in 10 to
2 in 5 contaminated transfusions (200 to 1,600 cases). National
passive-reporting studies from the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France (Table 2) suggest that one-fifth to one-
third would result in death (40 to 533 deaths per year) (35, 51,
57). This translates to a risk of death from a transfusion of a
bacterially contaminated platelet unit of between 1 in 7,500
and 1 in 100,000. Clinical observations from university hospi-
tals actively pursuing suspected cases of platelet-related sepsis
confirm these estimates. Ness et al. from Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, reported a fatality rate of 1 in 17,000 with pooled
whole-blood-derived platelets and 1:61,000 with single-donor-
apheresis-derived platelets (48). Similarly, University Hospi-
tals of Cleveland observed a fatality rate of 1 in 48,000 per
random platelet unit (21). The French BACTHEM study doc-
umented a fatality rate due to bacterially contaminated plate-
lets of 7 per 106 (1 in 140,000) (51).
From 1976 through September 1998, 51 fatalities thought to
be secondary to contaminated platelets were reported to the
U.S. FDA (36). Gram-negative organisms accounted for the
majority of deaths (59.7%). Similarly, passive surveillance
studies from the United Kingdom, the United States, and
France show that gram-positive organisms were implicated in
41 (71%) of 58 of cases but gram-negative organisms (mostly
members of the Enterobacteriaceae) account for the majority (9
[82%] of 11) of the fatalities (Table 1) (35, 51, 57).
TABLE 2. Organisms implicated in infections associated with platelet transfusionsa
Organism
No. of contaminated units in:
Total no.
United States United Kingdom France
Gram positive
Bacillus cereus 1 4 (1) 2 7 (1)
Coagulase-negative staphylococci 9 6 (1) 5 20 (1)
Streptococcus spp. 3 (1) 2 5 (1)
Staphylococcus aureus 4 2 (1) 6 (1)
Propionibacterium acnes 3 3
Subtotal 17 (1 or 6%) 14 (3 or 21%) 10 (0 or 0%) 41 (4 or 10%)
Gram negative
Klebsiella spp. 2 (1) 2 (1)
Serratia spp. 2 (2) 1 (1) 3 (3)
Escherichia coli 5 (1) 2 (1) 1 8 (2)
Acinetobacter spp. 1 1
Enterobacter spp. 2 (1) 1 (1) 1 4 (2)
Providencia rettgeri 1 (1) 1 (1)
Yersinia enterocolitica 1 1
Subtotal 11 (5 or 45%) 3 (2 or 67%) 6 (2 or 33%) 20 (9 or 45%)
Total 28 (6 or 21%) 17 (5 or 29%) 16 (2 or 13%) 58 (11 or 19%)
a Summary of organisms identified in the BACON, SHOT, and BACTHEM studies (35, 51, 57). Numbers and percentages of fatalities are given in parentheses.
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Clinical Presentation
Clinical sequelae of the infusion of bacterially contaminated
platelets are variable and may be acute or delayed (contribut-
ing to missed diagnoses). Ironically, the majority (85%) of
platelets are transfused to patients in the medical oncology,
hematology, pediatric hematology/oncology, and bone marrow
transplantation settings, all typically immunosuppressed pa-
tients (61). A study of platelet transfusions in autologous bone
marrow transplant patients found that 1 in 2,000 units of plate-
let concentrates associated with a febrile episode (within 24 h
of transfusion) were linked to bacterially contaminated plate-
lets (16). Of the 10 patients known to have received a bacte-
rially contaminated unit, 4 experienced septic shock.
Because of the severity of the patient’s underlying disease
and the variability in presentation and timing, sepsis resulting
from bacterially contaminated platelets may go unrecognized.
For example, an outbreak of Salmonella enterica serovar Chol-
eraesuis sepsis in seven patients was traced to one repeat
platelet donor, subsequently found to have occult chronic os-
teomyelitis (52). One patient died, and two had long-term
recurrences of Salmonella sepsis. The time to the onset of
illness ranged from 5 to 12 days (mean, 8.6 days). In many
cases, the platelet-related bacterial sepsis is discovered only in
retrospect. Investigations of two Serratia liquefaciens-contami-
nated red cell units led to platelet products from the whole-
blood donations and to the recognition of an associated septic
death in one recipient and bacteremia in the other recipient
(53).
TRANSFUSION-TRANSMITTED BACTERIAL
INFECTION OF PLASMA AND CRYOPRECIPITATE
Cell-free products such as plasma and cryoprecipitate are
stored frozen and thus are rarely associated with contamina-
tion. However, in some cases Pseudomonas cepacia and P.
aeruginosa have been cultured from cryoprecipitate and
plasma thawed in contaminated water baths.
SOURCES OF CONTAMINATION
Gram-positive skin commensals such as Staphylococcus epi-
dermidis and Bacillus cereus are the organisms most often re-
covered from donated blood (and implicated in bacterial con-
tamination of platelets). Such contamination is thought to
occur principally during phlebotomy, as a result of incomplete
disinfection and/or skin core removal (including skin append-
ages where the skin disinfectants may not penetrate) by the
collection needle (25). These organisms typically do not grow
at 1 to 6°C but survive and multiply readily at the platelet
storage temperature of 20 to 24°C.
In the case of gram-negative bacterial contamination,
asymptomatic donors with transient bacteremia are presumed
to be responsible for most cases of contamination. For exam-
ple, in the case of Y. enterocolitica contamination of red cells,
implicated donors typically are found to have elevated anti-
body titers (immunoglobulin M or G) to Y. enterocolitica, im-
plying a recent infection (38, 39, 60).
An outbreak of Serratia marcescens contamination of red
cells in Denmark and Sweden (29, 30) was thought to involve
the manufacturing process since the sterile bag sets were au-
toclaved and put in a clean but not sterile outer plastic pack-
age. It was thought that S. marcescens present in the dust in the
factory contaminated the outside of the containers and that in
the presence of moisture and a nutrient (the plasticizer dieth-
ylhexyl phthalate) the bacteria proliferated and gained entry
into the bag (58).
In rare cases, unusual circumstances have been identified as
the source of bacterial contamination. For example, a donor
with a pet boa constrictor, who reported fever and bloody
diarrhea treated with antibiotics 13 days prior to his donation,
was linked to Salmonella enterica platelet sepsis in two patients
(33). Scarring or dimpling of the venipuncture site (due to
prior donations) can result in recessed pits that are difficult to
adequately sterilize (3). A repeat single donor with a “dim-
pled” venipuncture site resulted in four cases of gram-positive
bacterial platelet sepsis in recipients (3). Another unusual as-
sociation was made between one donor in a platelet pool and
the death of a leukemic recipient from septic shock. The con-
taminating organism was identified as C. perfringens and was
thought to originate from a donor who had two young children
and frequently changed their diapers (42). As stated above, an
outbreak of S. enterica serovar Choleraesuis platelet sepsis in
seven patients at the National Institutes of Health Clinical
Center was traced to a repeat platelet donor with an occult
osteomyelitis (52). However, in most cases the source of the
bacterial contamination remains unidentified.
METHODS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF POST-
TRANSFUSION SEPSIS
There are multiple strategies to reduce transfusion-related
bacterial infection. The various approaches can be grouped
into four major categories: avoidance, bacterial detection, bac-
terial elimination, and growth inhibition.
Avoidance
Donor screening. Screening of donors to detect a possible
risk of infection or transient bacteremia (e.g., from recent
dental procedures) is routinely performed. However, question-
ing about symptoms suggestive of infection are often problem-
atic; for example, gastrointestinal symptoms have not been a
specific predictor (13% of donors have had gastrointestinal
symptoms in the previous 30 days) (28). Such questioning also
lacked sensitivity, since only 13 of 20 donors associated with Y.
enterocolitica-contaminated red blood cells recalled a history of
gastrointestinal symptoms (38, 39, 60; Cookson et al., Prog.
Abstr. 36th ICAAC, 1996).
Skin preparation. Skin disinfection reduces the skin bacte-
rial load (65), but a sterile venipuncture cannot be guaranteed
due to inaccessibility of organisms present in sebaceous glands
and hair follicles; organisms present in skin fragments may be
drawn into the component bag (25). Multiple studies have
evaluated skin disinfection in the context of blood donation
(25, 26, 43). A summary of the effectiveness of some of the
more commonly used skin disinfection methods is given in
Table 3 (43). In general, either iodine or povidone iodine are
used. In donors with allergies to iodine, chlorhexidine or dou-
ble isopropyl alcohol skin disinfection is employed. The differ-
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ence noted in Table 3 for two different isopropyl alcohol scrubs
was attributed to the abrasive nature of the sponge used in one
of the preparations.
Diversion of the initial blood draw. Several studies have
demonstrated the partial effectiveness of diverting the first 10
to 30 ml of blood from the initial collection. A study performed
with 22,000 samples of donated blood by the Red Cross in The
Netherlands, in which the first 10 ml of donor blood was
diverted from the primary bag, showed that 16 of the first 5-ml
aliquots were bacterially contaminated while only 2 of the
second 5-ml aliquots were positive after culture (19). A second
study in France showed that removal of the first 10 ml of donor
blood was associated with a significant decrease in bacterial
contamination (18,263 collections with 0.39% contamination
compared with 7,115 collections with 0.21% contamination; P
 0.05) (12).
Such methods are most effective with respect to skin con-
taminants (12, 19). However, it has been said that “one should
not be diverted by diversion,” since most fatal cases of bacterial
contamination involve gram-negative organisms and thus
would not minimized by diversion. Interestingly, the addition of a
diversion bag to whole-blood collections in the United States has
been initially complicated by hemolysis with certain sample tubes
(from Pall, East Hills, N.Y.) and dilution of the sample with
anticoagulant (from Baxter, Round Lakes, Ill), requiring redesign
of both diversion systems (data presented at the HHS Advisory
Committee on Blood Safety and Availability, Washington, D.C.;
http://www.hhs.gov/bloodsafety/pastmeetings.html#n).
Apheresis versus whole-blood-derived platelet concentrates.
Therapeutic doses of platelets can be obtained from two
sources. Platelets can be collected from a donor by the use of
an automated cell separator (apheresis); such collections can
yield one to three therapeutic doses. Alternatively, platelets
can be obtained from whole-blood donations (whole blood
platelet concentrates [WBPCs]); however, a therapeutic dose
requires the pooling of four to six WBPCs. Current estimates
suggest that 69% of all therapeutic doses of platelets trans-
fused in the United States are apheresis derived (1). Usage
varies considerably by country.
Since bacterial contamination may result from a contami-
nated venipuncture or an asymptomatic bacteremic donor, it
would be expected that pooled platelet products would be
associated with a higher risk of contamination than a single
donor product. From 1986 to 1998, the incidence of septic
events related to platelets at Johns Hopkins University Hospi-
tal decreased from 1 in 4,818 to 1 in 15,098 as the hospital went
from transfusing 51.7% to 99.4% single-donor apheresis units
(48). The overall clinical sepsis rate was approximately 1 in
2,500 for WBPC pools and 1 in 13,400 for single-donor aphere-
sis transfusion. The related mortality rate was approximately 1
in 17,000 for WBPC pools and 1 in 61,000 for single-donor
apheresis platelets. It was concluded that the use of single-
donor apheresis platelets is a simple means of reducing septic
platelet transfusion reactions. Similarly, the University Hospi-
tals of Cleveland have monitored the contamination rates of
both single-donor and whole-blood-derived concentrates [A.
Dykstra, M. Jacobs, and R. Yomtovian, Transfusion
38(Suppl.):104S, 1998]. The rate of bacterial contamination of
apheresis-derived platelets was 1 in 2,184. While the rate for
random-donor platelets was similar at 1 in 1,861, random-
donor platelet concentrates in a pool of six units would be
expected to result in a contamination rate of 1 in 310.
Bacterial Detection
Timing of detection. Culture studies performed both on red
cell units and platelets have shown that culture on the day of
collection invariably misses bacterially contaminated units that
would possibly achieve dangerous levels of overgrowth during
storage of the blood components [5a, 10; M. A. Blajchman, A.
Ali, P. Lyn, L. Bardossy, and H. Richardson, Transfusion
7(Suppl.):7S, 1997]. This is in contrast to viral contamination
of blood components, in which the virus or the immune re-
sponse to the virus (antibodies) is detected from a sample
obtained at the time of donation. Bacterial contamination of
blood components generally requires time for the organisms to
proliferate before being detectable in a small representative
sample of the product. Therefore, knowledge of the growth
characteristics of bacteria in blood components is essential
before one considers implementation of a detection strategy
(Fig. 2 and 3).
Growth characteristics of 165 platelet units inoculated (to 1
to 50 or 1,000 CFU/ml) within 1 day of collection with one of
the following: B. cereus, P. aeruginosa, K. pneumoniae, S. marc-
escens, S. aureus, and S. epidermidis showed that after 1 day of
storage all samples of B. cereus, P. aeruginosa, and K. pneu-
moniae had concentrations of 10 CFU/ml (the level of de-
tection), while only 71.4 and 84.2% of the S. marcescens and S.
aureus samples were at concentrations of 10 CFU/mL (10).
By day 3 of storage, all units inoculated with B. cereus, P.
aeruginosa, K. pneumoniae, S. marcescens, and S. aureus con-
tained 105 CFU/ml. Units contaminated with S. epidermidis
showed slower and more varied growth.
Bacterial culture. Although there are a variety of automated
and semi-automated systems, only two are FDA cleared for
quality control of bacterial culture in platelets in the United
States. The first is an automated liquid culture system (BacT/
ALERT; bioMérieux, Durham, N.C.) that uses broth bottles
with a colorimetric sensor which changes color as a conse-
quence of increasing CO2 produced by bacterial proliferation.
The machine monitors both the rate of change of the colori-
metric sensor and the absolute color change of the sensor.
Generally, one aerobic (and in some cases one aerobic and one
anaerobic) bottle is inoculated with 4 ml of the platelet prod-
uct. This system is not completely closed, since a needle is used













0 39 79 0 29
10 57 93 69 50
100 75 100 86 68
1,000 96 100 97 89
Mean count 175 3 161 237
a Data are from reference 43.
b IPA, isopropyl alcohol.
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to inoculate the bottles. It has been extensively validated by
tests with a wide range of potentially contaminating organisms
(7, 8, 11, 44). The method reliably detects contamination of
platelets inoculated to 10 CFU/ml and in many cases to 5
CFU/ml (e.g., B. cereus, S. marcescens, C. perfringens, S. epi-
dermidis, S. pyogenes, E. coli, K. pneumoniae, S. aureus, and
viridans streptococci) in 12 to 26 h. Propionibacterium acnes
(which is of questionable clinical significance in this setting)
required longer incubations. Recently, our laboratory com-
pleted an 11-month pilot program in which we cultured 2,397
apheresis-derived platelets on day 2 of storage (collection day
 day 0) and again at the time of issue (or following outdate:
days 6 to 8) (6). This study involved the inoculation of 9,588
bottles; one “machine” false-positive bottle (negative subcul-
ture, Gram stain, and repeat culture), and one inadvertent
contamination false-positive bottle (Propionibacterium sp.)
were detected. Thus, the overall false-positive rate was 2 in
4,794 samplings (0.04%, or 1 in 2,397 samplings) or 2 in 9,588
bottles (0.02% or 1 in 4,794 bottles). During this period, we
successfully interdicted three apheresis-derived units (one col-
lection) contaminated with S. epidermidis but were unable to
prevent the transfusion of four apheresis units contaminated
FIG. 2. Growth curves of four units of AS-3 red blood cells inoculated with S. liqueifaciens (two units inoculated to 4.2 CFU/ml) and Y.
enterocolitica (two units inoculated to 11.6 CFU/ml) (5a). Bacteria were not detectable by culture until days 3 to 6. Isolates were from strains
actually implicated in post-red-blood-cell-transfusion sepsis (the isolates were kindly provided by M. Arduino, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, Ga.).
FIG. 3. Growth curves of six bacteria species (S. marcescens, n  7; K. pneumoniae, n  21; S. epidermidis, n  21; Pseudomonas sp., n  15;
B. cereus, n  9; S. aureus, n  22) in 95 platelet units. All bacteria were inoculated on day zero at 10–50 CFU/ml (10).
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with Propionibacterium sp., for which the culture bottles were
reactive after 6 days of incubation. Thus, the overall true-
positive rate was 7 of 2,397 apheresis units (0.29%), with a
true-positive rate for aerobic organisms of 3 of 2,397 (0.13% or
1 of 799 units) and an anaerobic true-positive rate of 4 of 2,397
(0.17% or 1 of 599 units). Within our facility, transition from a
research setting to a clinical microbiology laboratory has re-
sulted in a higher false-positive (laboratory contamination)
rate of 0.6% per unit (with one aerobic and one anaerobic
bottle) (unpublished data). More recent experience from three
large blood centers is included in Table 4.
The second culture system is the Pall Bacterial Detection
System (BDS) (49). Sampling is obtained so as to maintain an
effectively closed system. Approximately 5 to 6 ml of leukocyte-
reduced platelet-rich plasma is removed from the bag and
passed through a filter that removes residual white cells and
platelets but allows approximately 50% of the bacteria (vari-
able by organism) and plasma to pass into an incubation bag.
The incubation bag holds 2 to 3 ml and contains sodium poly-
anethol sulfonate, which facilitates the growth of gram-nega-
tive organisms by inhibiting both complement and plasma
lysosomal enzymes and by antagonizing the action of growth-
retarding lipoproteins normally present in plasma. The incu-
bation bag is then incubated at 35°C for at least 24 h before the
oxygen concentration of the bag’s headspace is measured with
an oxygen analyzer. A decrease in the oxygen concentration to
19.5% or lower is an indication of bacterial growth. Thus, this
system does not detect obligate anaerobic organisms. Leuko-
cyte-reduced platelets challenged with 10 known platelet con-
taminants at doses of 100 to 500 CFU/ml were detected at a
rate of 96.5% at 24 h and 100% at 30 h (49). External valida-
tion studies have shown lower than expected sensitivity for S.
epidermidis and S. agalactiae [K.-A. T. Nguyen, T. Yamamoto,
and N. Hirschler, Transfusion 43(Suppl.):S63-030K, 2003;
H. C. Pleasant, G. A. Geele, and M. P. Holub, Transfusion
43(Suppl.):S62-030K, 2003 (abstract)]. Most recently, an en-
hanced version of this system has been cleared by the FDA, it
includes modifications to the configuration (with removal of
the filter, which removed some bacteria), and the incubation
bag now contains a platelet-aggregating agent and tryptic soy
medium to enhance the sensitivity and decrease the incubation
time (http://www.pall.com/BDS.asp??noleftnav).
Less sensitive methods of detection such as Gram or Wright
stains or the use of glucose and pH determination (in some
case with multireagent strips) are used for rapid detection of
bacteria in platelet components prior to transfusion. However,
the overall sensitivity is only 106 to 107 CFU/ml (13, 62, 63, 66).
Werch et al., from the M. D. Anderson Cancer Center, re-
ported on the screening of 3,093 platelet concentrates, in which
they found that multireagent strips for 30 bags had glucose
levels or pH outside of the reference range (63). Two of these
platelet units were culture positive for B. cereus. This screening
method resulted in 1 unit per 110 being wasted but prevented
two patients from receiving contaminated platelets.
Molecular biology techniques. Because of the high sensitiv-
ity and specificity and the rapidity of obtaining results, molec-
ular biological approaches are theoretically appealing for the
detection of contaminating organisms in blood components.
One such approach is the use of a nonamplified chemilumi-
nescence-linked universal bacterial rRNA probe (5, 9). This
technique was shown to detect four bacterial species in the
range of 104 to 105 CFU/ml. In some cases, S. aureus was
detected at levels as low as 102 to 103 CFU/ml. Other investi-
gators have pursued the use of PCR-based amplification for a
limited number of organisms (56).
However, bacterial DNA contamination of nucleotide am-
plification reagents (particularly the bacterially derived en-
zymes) and laboratory materials and the presence of bacterial
DNA sequences commonly found in human blood complicate
the usefulness of universal bacterial amplification techniques
(22, 45, 47). It also remains to be seen if complex molecular
biology techniques could be successfully deployed to a wide
range of transfusion services.
Detection systems recently approved in Europe. Recently,
two bacterial detection systems were approved in Europe. The
Scansystem (Hemosystem, Marseilles, France) involves a 70-
min solid-phase laser cytometry. In a few studies, the Scansys-
tem detected 11 organisms in the range of 10 to 103 CFU/ml
[P. Morel, M. Deschaseaux, X. Bertrand, C. Naegelen, and D.
Talon, Transfusion 43(Suppl.):SP13, 2003]. Positive samples
require a technologist to perform a microscopic confirmation.
A second “rapid” method recently approved detects bacteria
by using dielectrophoresis (Cell Analysis, Slough, United King-
dom). Platelet concentrates inoculated with six organisms at
concentrations of 103 to 105 CFU/ml were detected after 30
min of dielectrophoresis by image analysis as they were re-
leased from the electrodes when the electric field was discon-
tinued [C. P. McDonald, R. Smith, J. Colvin, S. Robbins, J.
Barbara, W. Betts, R. Anthony, K. Chan, A. Brown, and K.
Gregory, Transfusion 41(Suppl.):S119-040H, 2001].
Detection systems under development. Currently, there are
at least three other rapid-detection systems under develop-
ment. Genpoint (Oslo, Norway) has developed a unique sys-
tem that uses paramagnetic particles to concentrate bacteria
(BUGS’n BEADS) coupled with a PCR for highly conserved
DNA. The target sensitivity of this assay is 1,000 CFU/ml, and
the total time is 2.5 h. Immunetics, Inc. (Cambridge, Mass.) is
developing a 96-well 1-h enzyme immunoassay which employs
proteins and derived peptides that bind to the peptidoglycan
component of the bacterial cell wall. Preliminary results sug-
gest a sensitivity of 103 to 104 CFU/ml (or lower) for a variety
of organisms [L. A. Beausang and A. Levin, Transfusion
TABLE 4. Summary of recent experiences with culturing of
apheresis-derived platelets at three large blood centersa
Center
No. (rate) of resultsb
True positive False positive No.tested
New York Blood Center 5 (1/4,101) 5 (1/4,101) 20,506
Florida Blood Services 6 (1/1,790) 5 (1/2,147) 10,737
Puget Sound Blood Center 5 (1/1,800) 15 (1/600) 8,999
Total 16 (1/2,515) 25 (1/1,610) 40,242
a http://www.hhs.gov/bloodsafety/pastmeetings.html#n.
b True positive  positive bottles in which an organism was identified and a
repeat sample from the bag or a retention sample also contained the same
organism. False positive  positive bottles that contained no organism (machine
false positive) or from which the organism could not be reisolated from the
original bag or a retained sample.
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43(Suppl.):20A, 2003; D. Kagan, and A. E. Levin, Transfusion
41(Suppl.):S118-040H, 2001]. Verax Biomedical (Worcester,
Mass.) is developing an immunoassay embodied in a lateral-
flow format. Preliminary results suggest a sensitivity of 103 to
104 CFU/ml for a variety of organisms [F. Kenny, C. Wood-
bury, M. Pelak, J. Weinberg, and J. A. Hall, Transfusion
43(Suppl.):10A, 2003].
Implementation of detection systems: problems and consid-
erations. (i) Platelet concentrates and prestorage pooling.
Bacterial detection of whole-blood-derived platelet concen-
trates presents logistical problems for systems that do not allow
the prestorage pooling of platelet concentrates (e.g., United
States, Canada, and Hong Kong). In Europe, whole-blood-
derived buffy coat platelets are prepooled prior to storage; this
allows for the culturing of platelets by the methods described
above. If prepooling is not allowed, culturing of each individual
platelet sample is generally not thought to be practical due to
the loss of volume from each bag required per culture and the
high cost of culture for each individual bag. In the absence of
prepooling, many centers have chosen or are contemplating
the use of less sensitive bacterial detection strategies such as
Gram stains or glucose or pH measurement (or the use of
multireagent strips) (2).
(ii) Anaerobic organisms. Anaerobic organisms such as Pro-
pionibacterium sp. can be identified in platelets; however, it is
not known whether anaerobic organisms such as propionibac-
teria are clinically significant since growth in the aerobic envi-
ronment of platelet storage is slow and not favorable. Although
a few cases of Propionibacterium-contaminated units have been
infused into patients, no long-term sequelae have been re-
ported (6, 40, 55). Debate continues as to the value of an
anaerobic culture in this context. It is worth noting that some
aerobic organisms or isolates (e.g., viridans streptococci) can
be more rapidly detected in an anaerobic culture system (7, 8,
11).
(iii) Potential for reduced shelf-life. Some centers have cho-
sen to incubate platelet cultures for 12 to 24 h prior to release.
This has in many cases led to a decrease in the available
shelf-life of the platelets. Given that the current platelet prod-
ucts have a shelf-life of only 5 days (and that, for 1 to 2 days,
such products are not available, pending completion of viral
testing), any further reduction in available shelf-life can impact
inventory control and hospital supply.
(iv) Use of noncleared detection systems. Use of non-FDA-
cleared detection systems (e.g., alternative automated culture
systems) would at a minimum require internal validation. Ex-
amples of validation of detection systems are available in the
literature (7, 8, 11, 44, 49). Patent issues currently preclude
certain companies from actively pursing this market. Use of a
non-FDA-cleared device for bacterial quality control of plate-
lets, when cleared devices are available, may place an institu-
tion at higher legal risk should a patient die after receiving
bacterially contaminated platelets.
Bacterial Elimination
Pathogen reduction technologies. Continued efforts to cre-
ate a “zero-risk” blood supply have led to various pathogen
reduction technologies. A variety of photoactive sensitizers
have been investigated for use in the reduction of viruses,
bacteria, and parasites.
The best studied of these methods is the use of amotosalen
HCL (S-59), a synthetic psoralen combined with a photochem-
ical treatment process that causes permanent cross-links in
DNA and RNA (INTERCEPT Platelet System; Baxter
Healthcare Corp., Round Lake, Ill.) (41, 64). However, organ-
isms capable of spore formation may be resistant to photo-
chemical inactivation (34). The SPRINT trial, a multi-center
phase III trial, has evaluated the hemostatic effectiveness of
S-59 pathogen-inactivated platelets. Treated platelets were
found to be as effective as conventional platelets for the pre-
vention and treatment of bleeding; however, the treated plate-
lets resulted in a lower post-transfusion platelet response, re-
sulting in the need for 35% more platelets to support
transfusion-dependent patients (18, 41). Concerns also remain
regarding mutagenicity and teratogenicity associated with such
technologies.
Growth Inhibition
The addition of antibiotics to blood components has been
considered but has not been adopted due to the added risk of
drug reactions (trading one infrequent reaction for another)
and the potential for the development of antibiotic resistance
if small amounts of antibiotics were infused with every trans-
fusion (31).
THE PROSPECT OF SEVEN-DAY STORAGE WITH
DETECTION
Currently, within the United States platelet storage is lim-
ited to 5 days due to the fear of bacterial overgrowth during
storage at 20 to 24°C. In 1983, platelet storage in the United
States was extended to 7 days; however, in 1986 the FDA
shortened the outdate to 5 days following reports of bacterial
sepsis with older units (65). With the prospect of bacterial
detection, the possibility of an extended shelf-life is being re-
considered. European reports have described the use of bac-
terial culturing of platelets on days 1 to 3 of storage in order to
extend the shelf-life of platelets to 7 days, thereby reducing the
number of outdates [M. Ollgaard, I. Albjerg, and J. Georgen,
Vox Sang. 74(Suppl. 1):1126, 1998; D. Vuetic, J. Taseki, B.
Balint, and V. Mirovic, Vox Sang. 80(Suppl. 1):P371, 2000].
Within the United States, premarket multicenter studies (or
possibly postmarket studies) are currently under discussion to
provide data that may allow the extension of storage to 7 days.
It would be expected that the cost of culturing would be mit-
igated by the savings obtained by the extension of platelet
storage time (20). For example, in Denmark, when bacterial
culture was implemented in 1997, it was anticipated to be cost
neutral if the outdating could be reduced from 18 to 8% by
extending the storage time to 7 days (24). The actual outdating
rate decreased to 3 to 6%.
CONCLUSIONS
Regulatory oversight in the United States and Canada has
generally concentrated on new emerging threats such as West
Nile virus (leading to nationally mandated efforts to screen the
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blood supply with West Nile virus nucleic acid testing). How-
ever, there is no similar mandate in these countries for bacte-
rial screening. To place these risks into some perspective, in
2002 23 transfusion-transmitted cases of West Nile virus were
identified in the United States (50). Of these 23 recipients, 7
died, but only 5 of these deaths were associated with West Nile
virus meningoencephalitis. During the same period, 17 deaths
from bacterial contamination of blood components were re-
ported to the FDA (14). Contaminated apheresis-derived
platelets and pooled platelets were the products most often
implicated. Gram-negative bacteria were the causative agents
in the majority of these fatalities. It is perplexing that similar
(or greater) government emphasis has not been placed on the
detection of bacteria.
In blood banking and transfusion medicine, our paramount
concern is to improve transfusion safety for patients, in our
attempt to achieve a zero-risk blood supply. Unlike other re-
cent threats (existing or theoretical) to blood safety, the move-
ment for reducing bacterial contamination has come from the
blood-banking and the transfusion medicine community. In
this case, voluntary accrediting agencies such as the American
Association of Blood Banks and the College of American Pa-
thologists have taken the lead by developing standards to re-
duce the risk of bacterial contamination of blood components
(17, 23). Our patients deserve no less.
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